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On September 17, 1972, when Roosevelt Young entered the
home he had previously shared with his estranged wife, he found her
in the company of one Samuel Story. 1 An argument ensued between
2
Young and Story during which Young drew a gun and shot Story.
The victim was removed to a local hospital 3 where an evaluation of
his condition disclosed that one of the bullets had entered his neck
causing severe damage to his spinal cord. 4 As a result, Samuel Story
was left completely paralyzed from the neck down. 5 Subsequently, a
grand jury indicted the defendant on two counts-assault with intent
to kill and assault with an offensive weapon. 6
Exactly one year and sixty-three days later, on November 17,
1973, Story died 7 from the complications from the wounds inflicted
by Roosevelt Young. 8 Shortly thereafter, Young was additionally in-

' State v. Young, 148 N.J. Super. 405, 407, 372 A.2d 1117, 1118 (App. Div. 1977), rev'd
and remanded per curiam, 77 N.J. 245, 390 A.2d 556 (1978). Roosevelt and Patricia Young had
been married approximately five years and resided together at the scene of the incident until
about one month prior to the date these events transpired. Brief on Behalf of the State of New
Jersey at 5, State v. Young, 148 N.J. Super. 405, 372 A.2d 1117 (App. Div. 1977), rev'd and
remanded per curiam, 77 N.J. 245, 390 A.2d 556 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Brief for State].
Defendant was aware Patricia was "seeing" Story and had spoken to him on several occasions. He also had instructed Patricia not to permit any men in the house for the sake of the
children. Brief for State, supra, at 4.5.
2 State v. Young, 148 N.J. Super. at 407, 372 A.2d at 1118; Brief for State, supra note
1,
at 3-4. Defendant drew a gun; Story attempted to flee from the dining room to the kitchen.
Young fired five shots, three of which hit Story.
Defendant testified at trial that he had acquired the weapon the week before for protection
in his job as a night watchman. Brief and Appendix on Behalf of Defendant-Appellant at 8-9,
State v. Young, 148 N.J. Super. 405, 372 A.2d 1117 (App. Div. 1977), rev'd and remanded per
curiam, 77 N.J. 245, 390 A.2d 556 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Defendant-Appellant].
He denied being aware that the gun was in his jacket when he entered the house and that he
intended to shoot Story. Brief for Defendant-Appellant, supra.
' State v. Young, 148 N.J. Super. at 407, 372 A.2d at 1118.
4 Id. at 408, 372 A.2d at 1118.
5 1d.
6 Id. Defendant was indicted pursuant to Monmouth County Indictment No. 1216-72, filed
on July 3, 1973, for assault with an offensive weapon and assault with intent to kill in violation
of N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:90-2, -3 (West 1952).
State v. Young, 148 N.J. Super. at 408, 372 A.2d at 1118.
8 Id. at 408, 372 A.2d at 1119. The testimony of the medical examiner who performed the
autopsy on Story established the cause of death as "pneumonia secondary to a state of
quadriplegia due to the gunshot wounds." Id.
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dicted for murder. 9 The defendant moved to dismiss the murder
. indictment as barred by the common law "year and a day" rule. 10
The judge denied the motion 1 and the trial proceeded. Young was
2
convicted by the jury on the murder charge and the lesser offenses. 1
Based on a contention that the trial judge erred in failing to dismiss the murder indictment as barred by the "year and a day" rule,' 3
defendant appealed.1 4 Although the appellate division conceded that
the rule was part of the state's jurisprudence at the time of the
crime, 1 5 the court affirmed Young's murder conviction.' 6 This
anomalous result was a product of the court's decision to abolish the
rule and to give the decision retroactive effect, thereby depriving
Young the use of the defense.1 7 The Supreme Court of New Jersey
granted certification in the matter.'"
In State v. Young19 the supreme court reversed the appellate
division as to defendant's murder conviction. 20 The per curiam opinion reiterated the lower court's position that the year and a day rule
was the prevailing common law 2 1 but stated it should now be
9 Id. On January 25, 1974, after the death of Story, Monmouth County Indictment No.
546-73 charged defendant with murder in violation of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:113-2 (West 1952).
The pertinent statute reads:
2A:113-2. Degrees of murder; designation in verdict
Murder which is perpetrated by . . . any ...
kind of wilful, deliberate and
premeditated killing .... is murder in the first degree.

N.J.

STAT. ANN.

§ 2A:113-2 (West 1952).

10 148 N.J. Super. at 408, 372 A.2d at 1119.
11 Id.
12

Id.

Roosevelt Young was convicted of second degree murder and the assault counts. Id. He
was sentenced to a term of 15 to 25 years for the murder and concurrent terms of 5 to 7 years
on each of the other two convictions. Id.
13 Id.
14 Id. Roosevelt Young filed a Notice of Appeal pro se on June 5, 1975. Brief for
Defendant-Appellant, supra note 2, at 1. The Office of the Public Defender filed a Notice of
Appeal on June 17, 1975. Id.
15 148 N.J. Super. at 409, 372 A.2d at 1119.
16 Id. at 414, 372 A.2d at 1122.
17 Id.
1s State v. Young, 75 N.J. 540, 384 A.2d 510 (1977).
19 77 N.J. 245, 390 A.2d 556 (1978).
20 Id. at 248, 390 A.2d at 557. The action of the New Jersey supreme court in reversing the
judgment of the appellate division also resulted in a remand to the trial court with directions to
dismiss the indictment for murder and to reinstate the conviction and sentence for assault with
intent to kill. Id.
Further, the court held that the conviction for assault with an offensive weapon merged
into that for assault with intent to kill. Id.; see State v. Best, 70 N.J. 56, 61-62, 356 A.2d 385,
388 (1976); State v. Jamison, 64 N.J. 363, 380, 316 A.2d 439, 448 (1974).
21 77 N.J. at 252, 390 A.2d at 559. The court concluded that the year and a day rule existed
as the law during and after the critical events in this case. Id.
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abolished. The difference in the defendant's fate resulted from the
court's refusal to apply its decision retroactively. 22 The members of
the bench were unable to come to a uniform view on the matter of
either retention, abolition or modification of the rule or to the effect
of any such determination upon the judgment on appeal. 2 3 Hence, it
was left for the concurrences and dissent to assess the court's doubts
as to the means by which this departure from the common law was to
24
be effected and the scope of its application.
The year and a day rule, which Young sought to invoke to bar
his indictment for murder, is generally recognized as a principle of
common law jurisprudence.2 5 The rule sets forth the requirement
that death from an inflicted blow follow within a year and a day in
26
order for the blow to be considered the legal cause of death. Commentaries on the rationale behind its creation admit to diverse historical underpinnings. 2 7 The debate as to its actual basis figures promi28
nently in the assessment of its viability.
22

Id. at 248, 390 A.2d at 557. Contra, 77 N.J. at 261, 390 A.2d at 564 (Pashman, J.,

dissenting).
22 Id. at 245, 390 A.2d at 556 (1978). The per curiam opinion was accompanied by three
concurring opinions and a dissent. Id.
24 Id. A concurring opinion signed by Judge Conford agreed with the per curiam opinion to
the extent that he would not apply the rule retroactively. Id. at 257, 390 A.2d at 562 (Conford,
J., concurring). Judge Conford differed in that he favored expansion of the year and a day rule
to a period of three years thereby leaving extant some time limit during which a defendant may
be prosecuted. Id.
The concurrence of Justice Schreiber to which Justice Sullivan subscribed, supported the
per curiam opinion as to its conclusion that the rule had been the prevailing law but suggested
that setting any limits on causation was properly within the domain of the legislature. Id. at
259, 390 A.2d at 563 (Schreiber, J., concurring).
Justice Clifford's concurring opinion, in which Chief Justice Hughes and Justice Handler
joined, supported the essence of Justice Conford's concurrence but did not share his fear of the
effect of an unlimited time period during which prosecution may be commenced. The Clifford
concurrence deferred to the legislature's judgment and trusted that they would see fit to remove all bounds on causation. Id. at 261, 390 A.2d at 564 (Clifford, J., concurring).
Justice Pashman, the lone dissenter, subscribed fully to the opinion rendered by the appellate division. Id. at 262, 390 A.2d at 564 (Pashman, J., dissenting).
25 See id. at 247, 390 A.2d at 557. See generally I.W. HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS
OF THE CROWN 185-86 (7th ed. 1795); R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAw 28 (2d. ed. 1969); 19
CHi-KENT L. REV. 181, 182 (1941); 40 N.C. L. REV. 327, 332 (1962).
26 Elliott v. Mills, 335 P.2d 1104, 1106 (Okla. Crim. App. 1959); I W. HAWKINS, supra note
25, at 185-86; R. PERKINS, supra note 25, at 28; 3 J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL
LAW OF ENGLAND 8 (1883). But see 3 E. COKE, INSTITUTES 47 (1817).
27 65 DICK. L. REV. 166, 167 (1961); 40 N.C. L. REV., supra note 25, at 330; see text
accompanying notes 28-58 infra.
28 Compare Commonwealth v. Ladd, 402 Pa. 164, 166 A.2d 501 (1960) with People v.
Brengard, 265 N.Y. 100, 191 N.E. 850 (1934). The Ladd court concluded that the rule was
basically evidentiary and accordingly abrogated it as no longer useful. 402 Pa. at 169, 166 A.2d
at 507. In Brengard, the court admitted to the debate but abolished the rule on its determination that the New York Penal Code preempted the issue. 265 N.Y. at 107, 191 N.E. at 853.
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The Statute of Gloucester (1278) represents the first written embodiment of the year and a day rule. 2 9 As drafted, the statute
codified the principle's function as a limitation on an individual's private right to avenge the murder of his next of kin. 30 At this point in
England's juristic development, the King's court had not yet assumed
its position as the setting for the vindication of the rights of the
people. 31 Criminal matters were viewed as private affairs 32 rather
than breaches of the King's peace. Accordingly, the nearest male
blood relative was granted a private right which he could prosecute
before the community to obtain vengeance through a trial by battle. 3 3 The year and a day rule limited the period during which this
personal right, the "appeal of homicide," could be exercised. 34 While
the rule possessed the effect of a statute of limitations, 3 5 the rule did
not impact upon the state's prosecution for the homicide. 36
29 Elliott v. Mills, 335 P.2d at 1107. Statute of Gloucester, 1278, 6 Edw. 1, c.9; 65 DICK.
L. REV. 166, 167 (1961). The statute is in fact a legislative enactment of the "year and a day"
rule. Generally, the principle is treated as a judicially enunciated rule rather than a codified
statement of the law.
30 Statute of Gloucester, 1278, 6 Edw. 1, c.9. The law stated:
An Appeal for Murder
The King Commandeth that no Writ shall be granted out of the Chancery for
the death of a Man to enquire whether a Man did kill another by Misfortune, or in
his own Defence, or in other Manner without Felony; but he shall be put in Prison
until the coming of the Justices in Eyre, or Justices assigned to the Goal-delivery,
and shall put himself upon the Country before them for Good and Evil: In case it
be found by the Country, that he did it in his Defence, or by Misfortune, then by
the Report of the Justices to the King, the King shall take him to his Grace, if it
please him. It is provided also, that no Appeal shall be abated so soon as they have
been heretofore; but if the Appellor declare the Deed, the Year, the Day, the
Hour, the Time of the King, and the Town where the Deed was done, the Appeal
shall stand in effect, and shall not be abated for Default or fresh Suit, if the Party
shall sue within the Year and the Day after the Deed done.
Id.
31 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 256-57 (3d ed. 1923); H. POTTER, AN
HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LAW AND ITS INSTITUTIONS 344 (3d ed. 1948); 19
CHi-KENT L. REV. supra note 25, at 183.
32 19 CHI-KENT L. REV., supra note 25, at 183.
33 F. MAITLAND & F. MONTAGUE, A SKETCH OF ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 62-63 (1915).

This private right is what at various times has been denominated an "appeal". See note 30
supra. The authors illustrate the "appeal" process in a reference to Abraham Thornton's case.
When the brother of the victim chose not to exercise his right to avenge his sister's death,
Parliament had no recourse but to let the defendant go. F. MAITLAND & F. MONTAGUE, supra,

at 63.
31 4 W. BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES 312 (4th ed. 1938); 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF

ENGLISH LAw 315 (4th ed. 1939); 19 CHi-KENT L. REV. 182, 183 (1941); 65 DICK. L. REV.,
supra note 26, at 167; 40 N.C. L. REV., supra note 25, at 328.
40 N.C. L. REV., supra note 25, at 328-29.
a Id. As noted by the Brown court, the first day of the "year and a day" period used to
measure the time during which the appeal action could be brought did not coincide with the
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With the rise of the concept of criminal transgressions as violative of the social order, 3 7 public enforcement of penal sanctions replaced private retribution and gradually, this "appeal of homicide" fell
into disuse. 38 Although common law courts continued to apply it,
they construed the purpose of the rule as a restriction on criminal
liability. 39 Specifically, it was viewed as a method of preventing a
blow inflicted more than a year and a day before the victim's demise
from being considered the legal cause of death, rather than a limitation on the private right of action. 40 This interpretation of the rule
as an arbitra , 41 but necessary limit on causation was attributable to
the primitive state of medical technology at the time. 4 2 At a time

initial day from which the statute for prosecution of the murder would toll. State v. Brown, 21
Md. App. 91, 93, 318 A.2d 257, 259 (Ct. Spec. App. 1974). "Day one" for purposes of the
application of the "year and a day" rule is the day on which the blow is inflicted. 2 F. SCHLOSSER, CRIMINAL LAWS OF NEW JERSEY § 1382, at 656 (1953), 65 DICK. L. REV., supra note 26,
at 167; see R. PERKINS, supra note 25, at 28-29; 3 J. STEPHEN, supra note 26, at 8.
Murder is generally considered the type of offense which should not be subject to a statutory limit on prosecution. State v. Zarinsky, 143 N.J. Super. 35, 50-51, 362 A.2d 611, 619
(App. Div. 1976). Quite recently a New Jersey court affirmed the murder conviction of a
defendant who was indicted for murder five and a half years after the offense. Id. at 60, 362
A.2d at 624. The Zarinsky court cited strong public support for the "relentless prosecution" of
murderers as a factor in their holding. Id. at 51, 362 A.2d at 619.
Accord, State v. Brown, 21 Md. App. 91, 93, 318 A.2d 257, 259 (Ct. Spec. App. 1974).
17 19 CHI-KENT L. REV,, supra note 25, at 183; 40 N.C. L. REV., supra note 25, at 329.
'8 19 CHI-KENT L. REV., supra note 25, at 183. See generally State v. Dailey, 191 Ind. 678,
681, 134 N.E. 481, 481 (1922); State v. Moore, 196 La. 617, 620, 199 So. 661, 662 (1940);
Elliott v. Mills, 335 P.2d at 1106-09. The appeal was finally abolished in England by statute in
1819. 19 CHI-KENT L. REV., supra note 25, at 183 n.17.
'9 3 J. STEPHEN, supra note 26, at 8. The common law was concerned with the possibility
that one could be held liable for a death caused by an event remote in time. Id.
40 Elliott v. Mills, 335 P.2d at 1112. 10 HALSBURY, THE LAws OF ENGLAND § 1352 at 706
(3d ed. 1955); R. PERKINS, supra note 25, at 28. The rule has also been characterized as creating an irrebutable presumption. 10 HALSBURY, supra, § 1352 at 706. "If death does not ensue
until after the expiration of a year and a day from the date when the injury was inflicted, it is an
irrebuttable presumption of law that the death is attributable to some other cause .... " Id.
At least one commentator has questioned the effect the creation of a presumption has on
the prosecutor's case, since the existence of such a presumption implies the defendant's conduct
was a contributing cause in the decedent's death. 65 DICK. L. REX'., supra note 26, at 172 n.30.
For a discussion of the "private right of action" aspect of the rule, see text accompanying
notes 29-36 supra.
41 R. PERKINS, supra note 25, at 28. Because the courts persisted in the application of the
rule for several centuries, the characterization of the rule as "arbitrary" seems not to have
prejudiced the rule. 3 J. STEPHEN, supra note 26, at 8; see also State v. Brown, 21 Md. App. at
93, 318 A.2d at 259; Elliott v. Mills, 335 P.2d at 1107.
In abrogating the rule, courts have recognized the anomalous outcomes that inhere in the
application of an "arbitrary" rule. Commonwealth v. Ladd, 402 Pa. 164, 181, 166 A.2d 501,
510-11 (1960); see 65 DICK. L. REX'., supra note 26, at 172.
42 14 ALA. L. RE'. 447, 448 (1962); 4 BROOKLYN L. REX'. 86, 87 (1934); 40 N.C. L. REX'.,
supra note 25, at 329.
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when the precursor of the modern autopsy was embryonic at best,
the law lacked a method to conclude with any precision that a wound
inflicted well in advance of the actual moment of death was its proximate cause. 4 3 The year and a day rule thus served to remedy the
44
impreciseness of medical science in establising direct causation.
Related to the principle's role as a response to the problems that
inhered in the primitive stages of medical technology, was its function
as a solution to the limitations placed upon the law of evidence at the
time.4 5 In contrast with the modem jury's ability to make factual
findings based on their reliance upon expert testimony, common law
rules of evidence required that the triers of fact return a verdict
based solely on their own knowledge. 4 6 In light of this, 4 7 the year
and a day rule was transformed in usage to create an irrebutable presumption that a blow inflicted more than a year and a day before a
4
victim's death could not have legally been its cause.
Inasmuch as the principle had insinuated itself into the body of
common law jurisprudence developing around the crime of
homicide,4 9 in certain instances the rule has been given effect as a
substantive element of the crime. 50 Although today the law of
crimes is statutory, 5 1 the rule as a substantive element of the defini-

'3 Conscious of their responsibility to definitively determine the guilt of the accused, the
courts resorted to the "year and a day" rule to inject the requisite "certainty" into their determinations. See 3 E. COKE, supra note 26, at 53. In discussing the possibility that the intervention of other causes may supersede the blow inflicted as the cause of death, the common law
recognized that "in case of life, a rule of law ought to be certain." Id.
"4 State v. Brown, 21 Md. App. at 93, 318 A.2d at 260; CLARK & MARSHALL, LAW OF
CRMES § 10.00 (7th ed. 1967); C. KENNY, OUTLINES OF CRIMINAL LAW 140 (4th ed. 1909); R.
PERKINS, supra note 25, at 29; 4 BROOKLYN L. REV., supra note 42, at 87.
45 See generally J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON
LAW (1898).
" See generally S. GARB, 4 JONES ON EVIDENCE (6th ed. 1972); C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 10-13 (2d ed. 1972). The requirement that the verdict of
the triers of fact be based on their own knowledge pre-dated the expansive use of expert testimony in modern-day practice. Id.
47 See text accompanying notes 42-44 supra.
48 R. PERKINS, supra note 25, at 605. The author in discussing the "year and a day" rule
said: "Unless death occurs within this (the year and a day) period after the wound ... the law
conclusively presumes that the loss of life was due entirely to other causes and will not hear
evidence to the contrary." Id. (emphasis added); see 3 J. STEPHEN, supra note 26, at 8; 14 ALA.
L. REV., supra note 42, at 448; 40 N.C. L. REV., supra note 25, at 330.
"' Elliott v. Mills, 335 P.2d at 1108-09.
50 State v. Moore, 196 La. at 662, 199 So. at 662; Chapman v. People, 39 Mich. 357, 360
(1878); State v. Spadoni, 137 Wash. 684, 687-88, 243 P. 854, 856 (1926).
51 1 C. BURDICK, THE LAW OF CRIME § 83, at 83 (1946). Accord, Young, 77 N.J. at 250,
390 A.2d at 558. The New Jersey statutory definition of murder is contained in N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 2A:113-1 and -2 (West 1952). For the text of the statute, see note 8 supra. The Young court
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tion of murder can arise in two ways. Some jurisdictions continue to
employ common law principles as an aid to interpreting their statutory schemes. 5 2 Other jurisdictions dismiss as defective, indictments not alleging that death ensued within a year and a day. 53 The
latter position thus affords the rule substantive effect.
American courts have long recognized the existence of the doctrine 54 yet their opinions evidence the diversity of rationales capable
of justifying its application. The Supreme Court of the United States
addressed the doctrine in Louisville, Evansville & St. Louis Railroad
v. Clarke. 55 The court refused to bar the claimant's action despite
the fact that death occurred one year, two months and twenty-eight
days 56 after the injury was sustained. This failure to apply the rule
was distinguished by the context in which the suit arose. 57 Louisville
was a civil wrongful death action and although the court accorded

concluded the rule was "a constituent element of the crime of murder." Id. at 252, 390 A.2d at
559. This determination followed from their premise that the common law was part of the state's
jurisprudence and that the "year and a day" rule was integral to the common law offense of
homicide. id.
52 2A C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 50.01-.05 (4th ed. 1973).
The discussion of the use of common law principles to interpret statutory enactments, contained
therein, makes note of the fact that the antecedent common law of the subject matter of an
enactment comprises part of its legal history. Id. § 50.01, at 268. This recognition that it is the
common law that is the key to what the statutes are defining is appropriately applicable to the
mater sub judice where the court considered the applicability of the common law "year and a
day" concept to the murder enactment. See 77 N.J. at 250, 390 A.2d at 558.
The Elliott case, in examining the propriety of using common law principles, cites the
policy of their legislature in respect to the continued force and effect of such principles. Elliott
v. Mills, 335 P.2d at 1111.
53 Head v. State, 68 Ga. App. 759, 760, 24 S.E.2d 145, 148 (1943); State v. Dailey, 191
Ind. at 682, 134 N.E. at 481 (indictments dismissed as insufficient).
The occurrence of this result has virtually been eliminated by modern practices in criminal
procedure under which indictments need not contain the allegation that death transpired within
a "year and a day" from the initial infliction. 19 CHi-KENT L. REV., supra note 25, at 185-86.
" 19 CHI-KENT L. REV., supra note 25, at 184.
55 152 U.S. 230 (1894). In Louisville, the executor of the estate of Augustine Clarke brought

an action against the Louisville, Evansville and St. Louis Railroad Company. Id. at 234. The
plaintiff alleged that decedent's death was a consequence of the railroad's negligence. Id. at 235.
Plaintiff's decedent sustained his ultimately fatal injuries on November 25, 1886; he did not die
until February 23, 1888. Id. The action was initiated under the State of Indiana's wrongful
death statute. Id. The railroad defended on the basis that since the death occurred more than a
year and a day after the infliction of the injuries, they could not be legally responsible for
plaintiff's testator's death and hence the cause of action was barred. Id. The court refused to
accept this defense. See notes 57-59 infra and accompanying text.
56 152 U.S. at 235.
57 Id. The nature of the action was not a criminal prosecution for murder, the typical setting
for the application of the year and a day rule, but a wrongful death suit instituted by the
executor of the decedent's estate under the pertinent statute. Id. at 230.
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support for the viability of the rule under the criminal law, 58 it chose
not to extend the application of the principle to actions outside of the
criminal law. 59 Louisville remains the only United States Supreme
60
Court pronouncement on the matter.
The courts of the individual jurisdictions similarly have had little
occasion to pass upon the rule, 61 apparently because the factual situation which would warrant the invocation of the year and a day defense is not commonplace. In the decisions that do exist, the discussion of the rule arises in a context incidental to the issue before the
court, hence their statements do not rise above the level of dictum. 6 2 The states that have considered the present viability of the
63
rule have not been unanimous in their conclusions.

58 Id. at 230. "The reasons upon which the rule of a year and a day were applied in the
above mentioned cases (criminal proceedings) at common law do not apply with the same force
in purely civil proceedings that involve no element of punishment, but only provide compensation to certain relatives cf the decedent who have been deprived of his assistance and aid." Id.
at 242.
59 Id. This determination by the court removed plaintiff's bar to recovering under the
wrongful death statute. Id. at 242.
60 Actually, the Court has mentioned the year and a day rule in a criminal proceeding. Ball
v. United States, 140 U.S. 118 (1891). Ball dealt with the sufficiency of an indictment for
murder. On appeal, error was taken to the fact that the indictment under which the defendants
were charged did not allege the place and time of death. Id. at 126. The Court in deciding this
issue made reference to the fact that in order for a court to have jurisdiction over the offense at
common law, it was necessary that the time and place of death appear on the indictment. rd. at
133.
The Ball case does not affect Louisville's status as the only Supreme Court statement on the

year and a day rule because in Ball the victim died instantaneously. Id. at 122. The facts did
not present the case of a victim who had languished for a "year and a day" as Louisville had.
152 U.S. at 230.
61 14 ALA. L. REv'., supra note 48, at 448.
62 United States v. Hewecker, 79 F. 59, 61 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1896); Howard v. State, 24 Ala.
App. 512, 515, 137 So. 532, 534, cert. denied, 223 Ala. 529, 137 So. 535 (1931); Roberts v.
State, 17 Ariz. 159, 161, 149 P. 380, 380-81 (1915); Kee v. State, 28 Ark. 155, (1873); People v.
Steventon, 9 Cal. 274, 276 (1858); State v. Bantley, 44 Conn. 537, 540, 26 Am. Rep. 486, 489
(1877); Commonwealth v. Parker, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 550, 558 (1824); Commonwealth v.
Macloon, 101 Mass. 1, 6 (1869); Martin v. Capiah County, 71 Miss. 407, 408, 15 So. 73, 74
(1894); Debney v. State, 45 Neb. 856, 860, 64 N.W. 446, 449 (1895); Clark v. Commonwealth,
90 Va. 360, 363, 18 S.E. 440, 441 (1893); 19 CHI-KENT L. REV., supra note 25, at 184.
63 Only ten reported American decisions (in addition to the principal case) have dealt with
the rule in the precise factual context that precipitates its application, i.e., where the victim
died more than a year and a day subsequent to the fatal assault. Of these states, five applied the
rule to preclude prosecution for murder. Head v. State, 68 Ga. App. 759, 760, 24 S.E.2d 145,
148 (Ct. App. 1943); State v. Dailey, 191 Ind. at 682, 134 N.E. at 482; State v. Moore, 196 La.
at 622, 199 So. at 662; State v. Brown, 21 Md. App. at 99, 318 A.2d at 262; Elliott v. Mills, 355
P.2d at 1113. One state avoided upgrading a charge from assault with a dangerous weapon to
murder when the victim died, on the basis of the rule. Commonwealth v. Pinnick, 354 Mass.
13, 15, 234 N.E.2d 756, 757 (1968).
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In People v. Brengard,6 4 the New York Court of Appeals was
presented with a situation in which the victim lingered three years,
eleven months and twenty-one days prior to his death. 65 The court
declined to apply the rule to bar the homicide prosecution. 6 6 While
the opinion reflected the debate as to the genesis of the rule,6 7 the
judiciary's resolution of the matter was not based upon any of the
traditional rationales. Instead, the court held that the absence of a
reference to the year and a day rule in the codified definition of
homicide contained in New York's Penal Code 6 8 evidenced a legislative determination to abolish the rule. 6 9

The remaining four courts have declined to apply the rule to bar homicide prosecutions.
People v. Snipe, 25 Cal. App. 3d 742, 747-48, 102 Cal. Rptr. 6, 8-9 (Ct. App. 1972); People v.
Legeri, 239 App. Div. 47, 48, 266 N.Y.S. 86, 88 (Sup. Ct. 1933); People v. Brengard, 265 N.Y.
100, 106, 191 N.E. 850, 852 (1934); Commonwealth v. Ladd, 402 Pa. 164, 173, 166 A.2d 501,
506 (1960).
64 265 N.Y. 100, 191 N.E. 850 (1934).
65 Id. at 102. The situation in Brengard is similar to that in Young. Compare Brengard, 265
N.Y. at 102-05, 191 N.E. at 850-52, with Young, 77 N.J. at 277-78, 390 A.2d at 557. In
Brengard, a police officer was shot by an assailant while investigating an unattended automobile. 265 N.Y. at 102, 191 N.E. at 850. The bullet struck the officer's spinal column resulting in paralysis of his extremities and the loss of control of bodily functions. Id. at 103-05, 191
N.E. at 851-52. A physician attending the patrolman stated "[t]he minute that bullet struck his
back he started to die then and that is just the last thing that happened." 265 N.Y. at 104, 191
N.E. at 851. The incapacitated officer died in July, 1932. Id. at 105, 191 N.E. at 852. Similarly
in Young, Samuel Story was injured by a bullet with much the same physical consequences. 148
N.J. Super. at 407-08, 372 A.2d at 118-19. There, the medical examiner also concluded that
the victim's death was "directly related to the gunshot wounds." Id.
66 265 N.Y. at 105, 191 N.E. at 852; accord, State v. Brown, 21 Md. App. 91, 98, 318 A.2d
257, 262 (Ct. Spec. App. 1974); People v. Snipe, 25 Cal. App. 3d 742, 748, 102 Cal. Rptr. 6, 9
(Ct. App. 1972).
67 265 N.Y. at 105-07, 191 N.E. at 852-53. The court's difficulty in deciding the defendant's
fate was based on its attempt to resolve the inconsistency between the common law principle
and an earlier lower court decision. 265 N.Y. at 105-07, 191 N.E. at 852; People v. Legeri, 239
App. Div. 47, 266 N.Y.S. 86 (1933). As previously discussed, the year and a day rule would bar
the indictment but reliance on the lower court's opinion, which held that New York's penal
statute abrogated the common law principle, would allow the action to commence. 265 N.Y. at
105-07, 191 N.E. at 853.
The statutory definition of homicide reads as follows:
Homicide means conduct which causes the death of a person or an unborn
child with which a female has been pregnant for more than twenty-four weeks
under circumstances constituting murder, manslaughter in the first degree, manslaughter in the second degree, criminally negligent homicide, abortion in the first
degree or self-abortion in the first degree.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.00 (McKinney 1975). This version of the definition replaced the one
that existed at the time of the Legeri decision. id. The absence of the year and a day requirement from the enactment is readily apparent. id.
69 265 N.Y. at 105, 191 N.E. at 852; cf. State v. Brown, 21 Md. App. at 98, 318 A.2d at 262
(while Maryland did not have enactment abrogating the rule, court suggested that such legislative declaration would be necessary before it would act).

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10:389

Confronted with a similar factual situation in State v. Brown, 70
the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland applied the rule. 71 The
court's opinion traced the prior history of the principle 72 but did not
place reliance on any singular theory to support its conclusion that
the rule was in effect in its jurisdiction. 73 Nor did the court analyze
whether the rule should continue to apply. 74 The court did suggest,
however, that any contemplated change of the rule should be ac75
complished by legislative enactment.
Prior to New Jersey, the only jurisdiction to judicially abrogate
the rule was Pennsylvania in Commonwealth v. Ladd. 7 6 The
Pennsylvania supreme court's conception of the rule as an evidentiary
requirement 77 provided the basis for its decision to judicially effect
the principle's demise in Ladd. The court had no reservations about
its power to abolish an evidentiary rule without invading the legislature's domain. It explicitly stated that it is within the power of the
court to change "a common law rule of evidence without being guilty
of judicial legislation."- 78 The Pennsylvania court thus became the
only jurisdiction to agree 79 on a historical basis for the rule and proceeded to assess its viability in that function. 8 0

70 21 Md. App. 91, 318 A.2d 257 (Ct. Spec. App. 1974). Defendant had injured the victim
on November 14, 1970; she died September 13, 1972. Id. at 98, 318 A.2d at 262. Defendant
sought to have the murder indictment dismissed because the death occurred more than a year
and a day after the wound. Id. at 98, 318 A.2d at 262. In holding that the rule governed until
abrogated, the Brown court granted defendant's motion. Id. at 98, 318 A.2d at 262.
11 Id. at 98, 318 A.2d at 262.
72 Id. at 91-96, 318 A.2d at 258-260.
" Id. at 97, 318 A.2d at 261; accord, State v. Young, 77 N.J. 245, 390 A.2d 556 (1978).
74 21 Md. App. at 97, 318 A.2d at 261. The court was content to establish the existence of
the rule in its jurisdiction. The opinion contains no effort to assess the rule's continued viability
under any theory. Id. at 97, 318 A.2d at 261.
15 Id. at 98, 318 A.2d at 262. Elliott v. Mills, 335 P.2d 1104, 1116 (Okla. Crim. App. 1959)
(Brett, J., concurring) (citing court's deference to legislative action).
78 402 Pa. 165, 164 A.2d 501 (1960).
77 Id. at 174-75, 166 A.2d at 507. Contra, State v. Young, 77 N.J. at 252, 390 A.2d at 559.
The majority in Ladd were in accord that the rule is evidentiary in nature. 402 Pa. at 174-75,
166 A.2d at 507. The dissent in Young lauds the Ladd conclusion. 77 N.J. at 263, 390 A.2d at
565 (Pashman, J., dissenting). A vigorous dissent by Justice Musmanno challenged the majority
approach that the mere evidentiary status of the rule qualified it as a matter for judicial abrogration. 402 Pa. at 185, 166 A.2d at 512 (Musmanno, J., dissenting). Justice Musmanno viewed
legislative action as the proper method to effect the demise of the rule. Id. at 200, 166 A.2d at
520. His impressions are accorded support in the concurrences of Judge Conford, 77 N.J. at
255-57, 390 A.2d at 561-62, and Justices Schreiber, id. at 257-59, 390 A.2d at 562--63, and
Clifford, id. at 259-61, 390 A.2d at 563--64, in the principal case. See notes 98-112 infra.
7 402 Pa. at 169, 166 A.2d at 507.
• See note 77 supra.
60 402 Pa. at 173, 166 A.2d at 506.
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The Brengard, Brown and Ladd decisions represent differing
approaches to the issue of whether the year and a day rule should
continue to exist."' While illustrative of judicial thought, their value
as precedent is limited to their respective jurisdictions. The issue remained untested in New Jersey until State v. Young 82 presented the
courts with their first opportunity to consider the rule and its diverse
background. The per curiam opinion issued by the supreme court in
State v. Young states its conclusions in respect to the year and a day
rule. The court's decision necessarily involved a determination of
three issues: whether the common law rule was presently the law in
New Jersey; whether it should be abolished or modified; and, if abolition is in order, whether the action should be given retroactive effect. 83 In turn, the court's responses to those queries resulted in its
84
reversal of the appellate division.
The court had no difficulty in affirming the principle's presence
at English common law. 85 Once the existence of the rule at common
law was verified, the court was then able to confirm its place as part
of the state's body of jurisprudence. 86 The New Jersey State Constitution of 1947 and its predecessors 87 all contain clauses which effectively "incorporate" the common law of England into the state's
body of laws. 88 The court used this mechanism to establish the year
and a day rule in this jurisdiction. In so doing, it rejected the state's
argument that the principle under discussion had not survived the
most recent constitution. 8 9 The court adjudged the state's position as
more properly an attack upon whether the rule should continue to
apply. 90
Similarly, the court was unswayed by the state's argument that
since the New Jersey statutory provisions concerning murder omitted

81

See text accompanying notes 64-80 supra.

82

77 N.J. 245, 390 A.2d 556 (1978).

83 Id. at 247, 390 A.2d at 557.

" Id. at 248, 390 A.2d at 557.
85 Id.

at 249, 390 A.2d at 557.
86 Id. The court cites Justice Heher's dissent in Collopy v. Newark Eye & Ear Infirmary, 27

N.J. 29, 48-49, 141 A.2d 276, 287-88 (1958) (Heher, J., dissenting), as a concise analysis of the
manner in which principles of English common law became part of New Jersey's jural heritage.
77 N.J. at 249, 390 A.2d at 557.
87 77 N.J. at 249, 390 A.2d at 557. The predecessor constitutions are chronicled in the
quote from Collopy: they are the state constitutions of 1776 and 1844. Id.
88

See note 91 supra.

89 77 N.J. at 250, 390 A.2d at 558.
90 Id.
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reference to the rule, 9 1 the rule was implicitly abrogated. 9 2 The
court based the rejection of this proposition on the legislative history
of the penal enactments and a recognition of the continued role of
common law principles in interpreting statutory crimes. 9 3 Hence,
the bench unhesitatingly found the year and a day rule to be part
94
of New Jersey's present-day law.
The above determination being in the affirmative, the court was
constrained to assess the second matter on appeal-whether the rule
should be altered or abolished judicially. 95 The differing views of the
individual justices with respect to this issue are evidenced in the dissent and concurrences. Four members, Chief Justice Hughes and Justices Clifford, Handler and Pashman supported elimination of the
rule. 96 Justices Schreiber and Sullivan sought to retain it. 97 A
seventh member, Judge Conford, 98 suggested the rule be retained
but that the length of the period be modified. 99 Although a majority
of the court favored either abolition or modification of the rule, 10 0 the
per curiam opinion does not confront the dilemma of the justices' role
as judicial law-makers. 101 The only considerations of the propriety of
judicial action in altering a common law rule arises in the court's
analysis of whether its decision to abolish the rule should be accorded

91N.J.

STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:113-1 to -2 (West 1952). 77 N.J. at 250, 390 A.2d at 558.
92 77 N.J. at 250, 390 A.2d at 559.

93 Id. at 251-52, 390 A.2d at 559.
9 Id. at 252, 390 A.2d at 559.
95 Id. at 252, 390 A.2d at 558.
96 Id. at 259, 261, 390 A.2d at 563, 564 (Clifford, J., concurring, joined by Handler, J., &
Hughes, C.J.). Justice Clifford, Chief Justice Hughes and Justice Handler expressed their support for the abrogation of the rule in a concurrence to the per curiam opinion authored by
Justice Clifford. Id. at 261, 390 A.2d at 564. Justice Pashman arrived at the same conclusion,
but because he differed with the majority as to the effect of the abrogation of the rule, his
support of the abrogation issue was voiced in his dissent. Id. at 262, 390 A.2d at 564 (Pashman,

J.,

dissenting).

97 Id. at 259, 390 A.2d at 563 (Schreiber, J., concurring, joined by Sullivan, J.).
9 Judge Conford, a member of the superior court, appellate division, was temporarily assigned to the supreme court because of an existing vacancy.
id. at 255, 390 A.2d at 561. The legislature in California utilized such an approach in
enacting the statute applied in People v. Snipe, 25 Cal. App. 3d 742, 745, 102 Cal. Rptr. 6, 7
(Ct. App. 1972). That statute, CAL. PENAL CODE § 194 (West 1969), lengthened the period of
time after which it could no longer be presumed that a particular blow was the proximate cause
of death, from a year and a day to three years. 25 Cal. App. 3d at 745, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 7.
'o

See note 23 supra.

101 77 N.J. at 247-55, 390 A.2d at 557-61. The bench did not engage in a discussion of the
propriety of "judicially-legislating" the elimination of the rule within this opinion. Id.
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retroactive effect.10 2 Similarly, Justice Pashman, in dissent, faced
this problem of "judge-made" law only when he determined the
"retrospective-prospective" issue. l0 3 Justices Pashman, Handler,
Clifford and Chief Justice Hughes concluded that abolition of the rule
does not raise the specter of judicial legislation.10 4 Justices Schreiber
10 5
and Sullivan did express difficulties with such judicial initiative.
Their concurrence noted the current activity of the legislature in revising and codifying New Jersey's criminal laws. 10 6

In view of that

body's action in the area, Justices Schreiber and Sullivan preferred to
10 7
defer to the legislature.
Judge Conford's concurrence discussed one of the traditional
rationales for the rule, that of a limit on legal causation, before concluding that the rule should be modified. 10 8 His difference with the
per curiam approach stemmed from his view on the continued viabilit)' of imposing a limit on causation.' 0 9 Judge Conford suggested that
the time period used as the limitation should be lengthened to reflect
modern medical realities. 110 Accordingly, he proposed New Jersey

102 Id. at 253, 390 A.2d at 560.
10'

Id.

104 Id.

at 262, 390 A.2d at 564.
at 261-66, 390 A.2d at 564-66 (Pashman, J., dissenting); id. at 259-61, 390 A.2d at

563--64 (Clifford, J., concurring, joined by Handler, J. and Hughes, C.J.).
105 Id. at 257, 390 A.2d at 562 (Schreiber, J., concurring, joined by Sullivan, J.). These
justices recognize the traditional commitment under the constitution of changes in such matters
to the legislature. Id.
106 Id. at 258, 390 A.2d at 562 (Schreiber, J., concurring, joined by Sullivan, J.). The longawaited codification of New Jersey's criminal laws was finalized with the passage of P.L. 1978,
ch. 95 in August, 1978.
107 77 N.J. at 258, 390 A.2d at 562 (Schreiber, J., concurring, joined by Sullivan, J.).
108 77 N.J. at 255-57, 390 A.2d at 561-62 (Conford, J., concurring). Judge Conford's approach takes notice of the advances in medical technology since common law. Id. (Conford, J.,
concurring). Although he concluded these advances necessitated an expansion of the period
beyond a year and a day, he feared the "sword of Damocles" effect that an absence of any
limitation on prosecution would create. Id. at 255-57, 390 A.2d at 561-62 (Conford, J., concurring). He premised his conclusion on policy considerations. Id. at 256, 390 A.2d at 561 (Conford, J., concurring).
109 Id. at 256, 390 A.2d at 561 (Conford, J., concurring). The consensus of the bench supported the abrogation of the rule, implicitly, because advances in technology have rendered it
no longer viable. Id. at 255-57, 390 A.2d at 561-62 (Conford, J., concurring). The Conford
approach does not equate the current inadequacy of the "year and a day" period with a total
prohibition as a means for limiting legal causation. Id. at 256, 390 A.2d at 561 (Conford, J.,
concurring). Judge Conford's inability to support a complete withdrawal of ally limitation on
legal causation was based on the "Damoclesian" problem. See note 108 supra.
110 77 N.J. at 256, 390 A.2d at 561 (Conford, J., concurring).
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adopt the "California solution" "' and extend the period to three
1 12
years and a day.
This court's resolution of the first two issues on appeal essentially
mirrors the lower appellate division opinion. 1 13 The third issue,
which considers the scope of the decision to abrogate, i.e. whether it
should be accorded retrospective or prospective effect, is resolved by
the supreme court in a manner contrary to that advocated by the
appellate division. 1 14 The supreme court would not permit its deci1 15
sion to abrogate the rule, to subject the defendant to prosecution.
The court recognized that such an application would have the same
effect as an ex post facto statute. 116 The Young court refused to rule,

I" Id. at 257, 390 A.2d at 562 (Conford, J., concurring). The solution is so denominated
because the three-year time period was first codified by the California legislature, CAL. PENAL
CODE § 194 (West 1969). 77 N.J. at 257 n.1, 390 A.2d at 562 n.1. (Conford, J., concurring). The
legislative provision modifying the period from a year and a day to three years and a day has
been accepted by the California courts as made in recognition of the changes in medical science
since the original common law rule was implemented. People v. Snipe, 25 Cal. App. 3d at 747,
102 Cal. Rptr. at 9.
In Snipe, the act of the legislature in extending the period occurred after the defendant
engaged in his criminal conduct, was held not to violate the ex post facto prohibition of the
constitution. Id. at 747, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 9. In concluding that the lengthening of the period
did not contravene the constitutional proscription, the court couched their analysis in terms of
whether the extension deprived the defendant of a "vested defense" and determined that it did
not. Id.
112 See note 111 supra. The judge acknowledged the theoretical "idealness" of the legislature's acting on the matter, but concluded that the court ultimately has the responsibility for
adapting the common law to reflect current realities. 77 N.J. at 256, 390 A.2d at 562 (Conford,
J., concurring).
113 77 N.J. at 248, 390 A.2d at 557. The appellate division had previously held: (1) that the
"year and a day" rule was part of New Jersey's jurisprudence, and (2) that the principle should
be abrogated. 148 N.J. Super. at 409, 413, 372 A.2d at 1119, 1121.
114 77 N.J. at 248, 390 A.2d at 557.
115 Id. at 255, 390 A.2d at 560. Accordingly, the murder indictment against Roosevelt Young
was dismissed. Id. The appellate division in applying their decision retroactively dismissed as
unconvincing the very same arguments that the current bench found decisive in limiting the
effect of their action to future occurrences. Id. at 254, 390 A.2d at 560. The supreme court did
not accept the appellate division's position that the ex post facto prohibition did not apply
because the defendant had not "actually relied" on the year and a day rule when he engaged in
his criminal act. Id. For a further discussion of the "actual reliance" analysis, see text accompanying notes 127-38 infra.
116 77 N.J. at 253, 390 A.2d at 560. "An ex post facto law is a retrospective law applying to
offenses committed before its enactment which by its necessary operation and in its relation to
the offense, or its consequences, changes the situation of the defendant to his detriment."
Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 351-52 (1898). The United States Constitution and the New
Jersey Constitution prohibit the enactment of ex post facto laws. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3
and art. I § 10, cl. 1; N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 7, para. 3 (1947). The due process clause forbids
the same result from being achieved through judicial construction by a state supreme court. 77
N.J. at 253, 390 A.2d at 560. The Young court cited Bouie v. Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964), as
support for the proposition that judicial construction of a statute can similarly achieve a denial of
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as the appellate division had, that a criminal defendant must have
shown actual reliance 117 on the state of the law, before the ex post
facto prohibition would be invoked. 118 The court instead investigated the due process guarantee and concluded that principles premised on fair warning should govern regardless of the presence of
actual reliance. 1 19
The majority's decision to abrogate the year and a day rule prospectively in New Jersey closes a chapter on a principle that has obtained for centuries at common law. In their failure to trace the historical development of the rule as its functions evolved and paralleled
each other, the justices lost a mechanism that had the potential to
support a clearer decision.1 20 Had they engaged in a more penetrating analysis of the rule, the bench would inevitably have focused on
one of its rationales as supplying its raison d'etre in this jurisdiction. 121
A conclusion that the rule was merely evidentiary, as the Ladd
court had reached, 1 22 would necessitate that its abolition be handled
in a manner consistent with that used for implementing other changes
in evidentiary mechanisms. The failure of the Young court to come to
an agreement on the resolution of that point anticipated its split on
the issue of whether the rule should be abrogated retrospectively or
prospectively.

due process. The import of the Bouje decision is that judicial construction may not be used to
circumvent the constitutional requirement that a defendant have notice of what his conduct
violates. 378 U.S. at 352. The problem of an overruling decision which contravenes the ex post
facto prohibition has received scholarly recognition. See generally Levy, Realist Jurisprudence
and Prospective Overruling, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1960); 28 HARv. L. REV. 8082 (1915).
117 77 N.J. at 254, 390 A.2d at 560-61. The court differed from the appellate division on this
point. Id.
I's Id.
119Id. at 254-55, 390 A.2d at 560-61.
120 See Ladd, 402 Pa. at 170-72, 166 A.2d at 504-05. The Ladd bench's focus on the evidentiary aspect of the rule paved the way for their decision to abrogate. Id. at 169-70, 166 A.2d at
504-05.
121The accompanying opinions at least make an attempt at such an analysis. 77 N.J. at 25556, 390 A.2d at 561-62 (Conford, J., concurring). Judge Conford referred to the rule's earlier
function as a limitation on legal responsibility for the death after the year and a day period. Id.
(Conford, J., concurring). He dismissed the continued need for such a limitation after taking
notice of the progress made in medical science since that time. Id. (Conford, J., concurring).
A recognition of this history of the rule is also evidenced in the concurrence written by
Justice Clifford. 77 N.J. at 259-61, 390 A.2d at 563-64 (Clifford, J., concurring, joined by
Handler, J. & Hughes, C.J.). Similarly, the dissent mentioned that traditional rationale. 77 N.J.
at 263-64, 390 A.2d at 565 (Pashman, J.,dissenting).
122402 Pa. at 174-75, 166 A.2d at 507; accord, State v. Young, 77 N.J. at 263, 390 A.2d at
565 (Pashman, J., dissenting).
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The same reason that prompted the members of the court to
express reservations about judicially abrogating a common law rule,
namely, a fear of exceeding its constitutionally-delegated powers, 123
influenced their decision as to the scope that the abrogation was to be
accorded. A perceived problem of this court in concluding that the
decision to abrogate could not be applied retroactively, 124 was that
such action would violate the constitutional prohibition against ex post
facto laws. 125 In view of the principle that the prohibition is not
limited to actual legislative passage of a bill, but encompasses judicial
construction of existing laws, for the court to eliminate the rule
retrospectively would, in its express opinion, contravene the ex post
26
facto prohibition. 1
A realistic appraisal of the nature of criminal behavior would render their reservation unwarranted. The ex post facto prohibition is
concerned with the injustice that inheres in rendering an act criminal
(or more criminal) after the fact. 12 7 The court found it would "be
fundamentally unfair" 128 to subject the defendant to prosecution for a
crime for which he had become immune to prosecution at a prior
date.' 2 9 This analysis did not resort to the "actual reliance" inquiry
conducted by other courts.1 30 Those courts queried whether the defendant actually relied on the state of the law at the time he committed the criminal act. 1'' If it is found that he did, the ex post facto

123 77 N.J. at 254-55, 390 A.2d at 560-61.
124 Id. at 248, 390 A.2d at 557.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 254, 390 A.2d at 560.
127 Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 292, rehearing denied, 434 U.S. 882 (1977). The prohibition has traditionally been directed against legislative acts and not judicial decisions. In re

Smigelski, 30 N.J. 513, 526, 154 A.2d 1, 8 (1959).
128 77 N.J. at 254, 390 A.2d at 560.
129 Id.
130 Id. The court did not avail itself of the "actual reliance" analysis: "Actual reliance by a
defendant on the preexisting state of the criminal law is not a prerequisite to invocation of the
principle [the year and a day rule] under consideration." Id. The appellate division, in contrast
to the supreme court, considered "actual reliance" by the defendant on the state of the criminal
law at the time he committed the act, necessary before they would extend the "benefits" of the
prohibition to that defendant. 148 N.J. Super. at 413, 372 A.2d at 1121.
131 State v. Koonce, 89 N.J. Super. 169, 185, 214 A.2d 428, 436-37 (App. Div. 1965). The
application of the actual reliance formula is implicit. Id. For example, the court in Koonce
stated: "It must be remembered that when the inculpated conduct occurred it was undoubtedly
the general understanding that the common-law . . . applied in this State." Id.
The lower court in Young cited Koonce as authority for their decision to apply the abrogation restrospectively. 148 N.J. Super. at 413, 372 A.2d at 1121. The notion that the defendant
actually relied on the existence of the "year and a day" rule was "preposterous" to the appellate
division. Id.
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prohibition shields him from prosecution. 1 3 2 While this approach
also seeks to avoid fundamental unfairness to the defendant, it does,
at least, inquire whether there was in fact a belief on defendant's part
that he was circumscribing his behavior to fall within the known
limits of the law. Both approaches ignore the reality of this particular
factual context. In shooting the victim, the defendant acted, at the
least, with a reckless disregard for human life which is constructive
intent.13 3 The context in which the crime occurred was not accidental.13 4 Defendant's conduct was a deliberate offensive assault with a
dangerous weapon.' 3 5 He acted with the knowledge that the victim's
death was a foreseeable result. The law should not protect him because of the "mere fortuity" that at the time he so acted a year and a
day rule was in effect.' 36 Failure to accord the abolition of the rule
retrospective effect creates the peculiar situation that the abrogation
does not obtain uniformity in this jurisdiction until every lingering
victim of a defendant's blow survives for three hundred sixty-six
days.' 3 7 In effect, the supreme court's decision bestows an "extra"
defense upon current defendants.' 3 8 The appellate division's ap-

Despite the appellate division's refusal to engage in the actual reliance analysis, that test
has been utilized by other courts. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 195 (1977); State v.
Hatch, 64 N.J. 179, 188, 313 A.2d 797, 801-02 (1973); State v. Saulnier, 63 N.J. 199, 208, 306
A.2d 67, 69 (1973); Johnson v. State, 18 N.J. 422, 428, 114 A.2d 1, 4 (1955); State v. Koonce,
89 N.J. Super. at 185, 214 A.2d at 436-37 (App. Div. 1965),
132 77 N.J. at 253-55, 390 A.2d at 559-61. Although the reliance aspect has been considered
with reference to the ex post facto prohibition, see 89 N.J. Super. 169, 185, 214 A.2d 423,
436-37 (App. Div. 1965), there is no reliance element present in the ex post facto clauses of
either the federal or state constitutions. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl.3 and art. I, § 10, cl.1;
N.J. CONST. art. IV, § VII, para. 3 (1947).
133 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.1 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). "A person is guilty of criminal homicide if he purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently causes the death of another
human being." Id. (emphasis added).
" See 148 N.J. Super. at 407-08, 372 A.2d at 1118.
135 Id.
136 77 N.J. at 261, 390 A.2d at 564 (Pashman, J., dissenting). Justice Pashman's dissent is
particularly concerned with the injustice that inheres in the "mere fortuity" of a victim lingering
beyond the year and a day period. Id. (Pashman, J., dissenting).
13' Since the year and a day defense is available to all criminal defendants whose victims had
not yet died at the date of the decision in State v. Young, the point in time at which the
abrogation takes uniform effect conceivably may be well into the future. For example, a
defendant who assaults an individual on the day before the decision, has the right to invoke the
defense at his trial and subsquent appeals even though his indictment for the act is not handed
down until many years after the fatal blow was inflicted.
138 By its decision not to apply the abrogation of the rule retroactively, Roosevelt Young and
every other defendant whose victim had not yet died by the date of the decision in State v.
Young is absolved from liability for prosecution, hence an extra defense has been afforded these
individuals. See 77 N.J. at 248, 390 A.2d at 557.
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proach, which applied an actual reliance test, 139 avoids this anomaly.
The actual impact of the decision in State v. Young abrogating
the rule will necessarily be minimal because the factual situation that
suggests its use occurs infrequently. Deaths usually occur more or
less contemporaneously with the blow inflicted. The decision exists
for its acknowledgment that developments in technology need affect
the law. The abrogation of the year and a day rule in this jurisdiction
demonstrates the continued willingness of the courts to take judicial
notice of technological reality.
Dolores J. Ostaszewski
139 148 N.J. Super. at 414, 372 A.2d at 1122.

